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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LANA MARIE GUTIERREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930190-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, as 
applicable to the States by the fourteenth amendment, provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Emphasis added. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The transcript submitted as an exhibit was created from 
the original produced by the police after defense counsel listened 
to the taped interrogation and filled in sections marked 
"(inaudible)" and made corrections.1 
The State stipulated that the transcript as modified and 
submitted (R. 38-56) was accurate: 
THE COURT: And both sides basically stipulate 
that the transcript submitted to me is an accurate 
transcript of what was said, both by law enforcement and 
by the defendant; is that correct, Mr. Spikes? 
MR. SPIKES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Loyd, is that correct? 
MR. LOYD: That is correct, Your Honor. 
Particularly on these two points, there were no 
corrections to the original transcripts, to the two 
sections that were cited in my motion. 
1See R. 39 ("everything's cool" substituted for "inaudible"), 
R. 40 ("it was" inserted in substitution of ellipses), R. 41 ("else 
was" substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 44 ("I think I took it" 
substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 45 ("for" substituted for 
"through"), R. 49 ("Me and him" substituted for "we . . "; 
"Boyfriend/girlfriend" substituted for "(inaudible)"; "Yes." 
inserted; "was I headed now" inserted in substitution of ellipses), 
R. 50 ("I was" substituted for "Up"; "Yes I did go into a bar" 
substituted for "I guess (inaudible)"; "drinking" substituted for 
"screaming"; "'Then be like that.'" substituted for "(inaudible)"), 
R. 51 ("one of them, you know, that you cut things with." 
substituted for "(inaudible)"; "mess[ed] up" substituted for 
"nuts"; "Then I was drunk" substituted for "(inaudible)"; "Me and 
him was" substituted for "We"), R. 52 ("he was hitting me, too. 
That's why too." substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 53 ("fell" 
substituted for "bowed"), R. 54 ("when I left" inserted; "have" 
inserted; "here" substituted for "him"), and R. 56 ("They had to 
book me in and everything." inserted; "(Lana crying)" inserted). 
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R. 231:23-232:7. At no time did the State ask to play the tape for 
the Court, and at no time did the Court indicate any reluctance to 
listen to the tape of the interrogation. 
Now, for the first time on appeal, the State asserts that 
a copy of the tape recording of the interrogation should have been 
played for the trial court, and testimony from the interrogating 
officers should have been introduced in opposition to Ms. 
Gutierrez' motion to suppress. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In its brief, the State has requested that this matter be 
remanded to afford the State an opportunity to create a 
supplemental record of evidence that the State chose not to 
introduce before. The State should be limited to the record made 
below. Case law cited by the State indicates only that appellate 
courts should rule only after reviewing all the evidence presented 
below, and after the trial court has considered the matter on the 
merits. The record here is complete and accurate, and the trial 
court ruled directly on the issue of whether Ms. Gutierrez invoked 
her right to remain silent. This matter is ripe for decision. 
There is no basis in law, equity, or on the facts which would allow 
the State the relief they seek. The State is limited to the record 
it created below. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MS. GUTIERREZ HAS ACTIVELY ASSERTED 
HER CLAIM OF COERCION WITH RESPECT TO HER 
INTERROGATION. 
(Responding to n.2, p. 25 of Appellee's Brief) 
The State asserts that Ms. Gutierrez "affirmatively 
waived any claim that her statement was the product of coercion." 
Appellee's brief at p. 25, n.2. The State misinterprets defense 
counsel's statement. Counsel is correctly quoted as saying, "We're 
not, in our motion, suggesting that there was other coercive 
activity going on in and around the interview . . . " R. 231 
(emphasis added). Appellant is not asserting that the officers 
threatened to break her arms or kill her if she did not confess. 
This is not to say, however, that no coercion occurred. 
Ms. Gutierrez motion to suppress was filed because her 
statements were coerced in violation of her fifth amendment rights. 
This particular coercion, which was challenged and is preserved, 
was unaccompanied by any other additional coercion. The coercion 
which did occur is just as harmful, improper, and illegal as any 
other type of coercion which did not occur. 
In Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 
113 L.Ed.2d 302, reh. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2067, 114 L.Ed.2d 472 
(1991), the United States Supreme Court adopted the harmless error 
doctrine in the context of coerced confessions. The State argues 
that Fulminante has no application to this case. The harmless 
error doctrine only has application on appeal. Appellant is 
unaware of any case holding that contentions concerning the 
4 
standard of review on appeal must be raised in the trial court. 
Appellant's claim that Fulminante should be rejected under the Utah 
Constitution is properly before this Court. 
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS 
BURDEN OF DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE RECORD 
IN THE TRIAL COURT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING. THE STATE HAS CONFESSED 
ERROR, AND MS. GUTIERREZ IS ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL. 
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
A. THE STATE HAS NOW CONFESSED ERROR. 
The State admits: 
Even though it prevailed before the trial 
court, the State does not believe it can ask this Court 
to affirm the trial court's ruling based on the 
inadequate record that was developed below. 
Appellee's brief at 26. Since the State had the burden in the 
trial court, and has conceded in this Court that it did not sustain 
that burden, the inquiry is ended. The State has confessed error, 
and Ms. Gutierrez is entitled to a new trial.2 
2Even if this Court determines that the State has "stoptped] 
short of conceding" Ms. Gutierrez' arguments, see State v. Sampson, 
808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 
507 (1992), "the state should have raised the argument in its 
initial briefing on appeal if it believed this fall-back position 
had merit." Id. Sampson was cited throughout Appellant's Brief. 
The State is fully aware of its obligation to brief its legal 
arguments on appeal, and one must assume the State read Sampson as 
a result of appellant's reliance on it. The State's failure to 
argue any legal issues concerning the right to remain silent can 
only be construed as a concession of the accuracy of appellant's 
position. The State has placed all its eggs in one basket by 
seeking a remand without arguing the merits at all. Under these 
circumstances, this Court is fully justified in finding that the 
State has conceded error. 
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B. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND OF 
MAKING AN ADEQUATE RECORD WAS ON THE 
STATE, AND ITS FAILURE MANDATES 
REVERSAL. 
The State has "a heavy burden to establish both that a 
defendant understood h[er] Miranda rights and that [s]he 
voluntarily waived them." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 
1986)), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied. 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). See also State v. 
Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987) ("The right to remain 
silent and the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation 
may be waived, but these waivers must be both intentional and made 
with full knowledge of the consequences, and the defendant is given 
the benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a 
waiver."), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d 
864 (1988) . Because the burden was squarely on the State, and the 
State now concedes that the record they made is inadequate, Ms. 
Gutierrez is entitled to an order of reversal, and an order that 
her statements be suppressed at any retrial. 
POINT III. REMAND IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR 
NECESSARY. 
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's brief) 
A. ABSENT A SHOWING THAT THE STATE WAS 
WRONGFULLY PRECLUDED FROM MAKING AN 
ADEQUATE RECORD, REVIEW IS LIMITED 
TO THE ACTUAL RECORD MADE. 
Appellate courts cannot rule on matters outside the trial 
court record. State v. Sparks. 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah 1983), 
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overruled on other grounds bv State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 
n.8 (Utah 1987) . The record does not reveal that the State ever 
attempted to introduce a recording of the interrogation into 
evidence.3 The State may not seek to introduce a recording of the 
interrogation now, on appeal, where they failed to do so below. 
"Generally, a [litigant] who fails to bring an issue 
before the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on 
appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("'some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the 
trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal'", quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). 
The State here is not claiming error on the part of the 
trial court.4 Rather, the State is claiming that it made a 
tactical error when it freely and voluntarily decided what evidence 
to present at the suppression hearing. The State is bound by its 
decision not to introduce the recording of the interrogation, and 
it may not be offered and introduced on appeal or on remand.5 
3To the contrary, the record shows that the state stipulated 
to the accuracy and use of the written transcript, thereby 
affirmatively waiving the opportunity to introduce the recording 
into evidence at the suppression hearing. 
4E.g., by excluding the recording, or ruling summarily without 
allowing the State to make a record. 
5Appellant's vigorous opposition to the State's requested 
remand to introduce the tape recording of the interrogation should 
not be misconstrued as an indication that there is anything 
contained therein that would help the State. Chuck Loyd, trial 
counsel for Ms. Gutierrez, painstakingly reviewed the recording 
when he corrected the State's sloppy transcription. He has 
indicated to appellate counsel that the recording is unremarkable. 
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The State has made no showing that the tape recording 
differs in any way from the transcript to which it stipulated in 
the trial court. Counsel for the State has not included an 
affidavit setting forth with particularity what it believes the 
recording will show. Compare Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (counsel is required to include "affidavits alleging 
facts not fully appearing in the record" when a defendant asserts 
ineffective assistance of counsel and moves for remand). The 
State's request for remand has no factual foundation and is based 
entirely on speculation that the tape might help the State's 
argument. Requiring appellant to continue to defend this case on 
remand is a waste of valuable time and resources, and is without 
merit. 
B. CASE LAW CITED BY THE STATE IS 
INAPPOSITE AND DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
STATE'S REQUEST FOR A REMAND. 
The State correctly notes that "[o] ther courts that have 
faced the task of determining whether similar statements served to 
invoke a defendant's rights under Miranda have relied on tapes of 
the interrogation and testimonial evidence to put the defendant's 
statements in their proper context." Appellee's Brief at 27-8. In 
all those cases, however, the tapes and testimonial evidence were 
properly presented in the trial court. The State does not cite a 
single case where an appellate court has allowed the State to 
Perhaps the prosecutor stipulated to the accuracy of the transcript 
because it in fact is accurate, and declined to introduce the 
recording because it adds absolutely nothing. 
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present additional evidence in a case on appeal to support the 
trial court's determination. 
In People v. Porter, 221 Cal.App.3d 1213, 270 Cal.Rptr. 
773 (1990) : 
At trial, defendant objected in limine on 
Miranda grounds to the introduction of a taped confession 
he had given to police officers. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 
trial court ruled defendant's confession admissible. A 
redacted version of the tape was then played for the 
jury. 
Id. at 1216, 270 Cal.Rptr. at 775 (emphasis added). The State's 
discussion of Porter, Appellee's brief at 31-4, correctly notes 
that consideration of the tape of the confession aided the court, 
but the court was only reviewing the evidence properly offered and 
received by the trial court. In this case, that evidence consists 
solely of the stipulated transcript. This court should review that 
transcript; nothing more, nothing less. 
People v. Jennings, 760 P.2d 475 (Cal. 1988), cert. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 1559, 103 L.Ed.2d 862 (1989) is 
similar: 
After an independent review of the videotaped 
interrogation of defendant we conclude that the trial 
judge, who also reviewed the tape . . . 
Id. at 479 (emphasis added) . No new evidence was allowed or 
addressed on appeal. 
The State's discussion of State v. Chapman, 605 A. 2d 1055 
(N.H. 1992) indicates that this case also deals only with an 
appellate court reviewing the evidence presented in the trial 
court. "'At the hearing of defendant's motion to suppress, the 
trial court heard three days of testimony and viewed the videotape 
9 
. . .'" Appellee's brief at 30 quoting Chapman at 1060 (emphasis 
added) . Chapman does not stand for the proposition that the State 
may attempt to supplement the record with evidence that was never 
offered below. 
Similarly, the trial court in People v. Silva, 754 P.2d 
1070 (Cal. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 820, 102 
L.Ed.2d 809 (1989), listened to the taped interrogation. See 
Appellee's Brief at 36 ("'Here, the trial court listened to the 
tape recording . . .'"; quoting Silva at 1083-4) . Silva does not 
advance the State's position. 
The State's contention that testimony from the officers6 
and Ms. Gutierrez7 might be illuminating does not provide a basis 
for remand. First, the only relevant intent is the intent of Ms. 
Gutierrez. The burden is on the state to show a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of defendant's Miranda rights. The intent of the 
officers is irrelevant.8 There is no good faith exception for 
6See Appellee's Brief at 38 ("the testimony of [Officers] 
Potter or Romero might reveal whether the officers were uncertain 
about whether defendant was expressing a desire to remain silent 
but pressed forward anyway. Their testimony might also reveal that 
they did not fully appreciate the legal significance of defendant's 
statements."); Appellee's Brief at 27 ("the officers may be able to 
explain how they were situated at critical times during the 
interrogation and how they interpreted defendant's statements."). 
7See Appellee's Brief at 39 ("Similarly, it may be that 
defendant herself will acknowledge that her statements were not 
intended to be an invocation of her right to remain silent."). 
8The State quotes Hatcher v. State, 379 S.E.2d 775, 778 n.3 
(Ga. 1989) for language indicating the officers in that case 
believed "'only the suspect's invocation of his right to counsel 
required halting the interrogation.'" Appellee's Brief at 38-9. 
Despite the State's claim that on remand officers Potter and Romero 
might reveal information indicating their ignorance of their 
constitutional obligations to Ms. Gutierrez, such a revelation 
would not help the State's position. Obviously, police officers 
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coerced confessions. Finally , Ms. Gutierrez has the absolute 
right to remain silent at any evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
The State's suggestion that Ms. Gutierrez might help its case on 
remand is speculation as to an event that is unlikely to occur in 
the face of her right to remain silent.9 
POINT IV. STRAIN AND WILLETT DO NOT ADVANCE 
THE STATE'S POSITION THAT REMAND IS 
APPROPRIATE. 
(Responding to Point II, subsection 2 of 
Appellee's Brief) 
Utah case law cited by the State supports the following 
propositions: 1) appellate courts should have a complete record 
before ruling; and 2) appellate courts should decline to address 
matters for the first time on appeal. The only Utah case law cited 
by the State is State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989) and 
Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992). Neither case 
authorizes the relief the State now seeks. The record in this case 
are charged with knowledge of the law. Their understanding or 
belief doesn't impact the inquiry into whether Ms. Gutierrez waived 
her rights. This gross speculation by the State is simply 
irrelevant to the necessary inquiry here. 
9Counsel is hesitant to disclose matters concerning attorney-
client discussions, but would indicate to the court that he has 
come across nothing in the record or in conversations with Ms. 
Gutierrez that would indicate any factual basis for the State's 
rampant speculation that Ms. Gutierrez, if she could be forced to 
testify, might indicate that she did not seek to terminate the 
interrogation. 
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is complete,10 and the trial court ruled on all determinative 
issues. 
Willett involved a pre-Gibbons11 plea, which had to be 
assessed under the "substantial compliance" test. The Supreme 
Court could not affirm on the basis of the incomplete record before 
it-. 
However, we do not know that the plea was 
defective. We do not have a complete copy of the 
preliminary hearing transcript before us, and for that 
reason, we cannot determine whether what occurred at the 
preliminary hearing was sufficient to provide a factual 
basis for plaintiff's later plea. We therefore remand 
the matter to the trial court to permit the State an 
opportunity to produce a proper transcript of the 
preliminary hearing or to otherwise prove what occurred 
there. 
Willett, 842 P.2d at 863. This remand was very limited in scope, 
and no new or additional evidence was to be adduced. 
In this case, we know exactly what transpired below. The 
record is accurate, complete, and determinative of all issues 
raised on appeal. The State did not even attempt to introduce a 
recording of the interrogation; rather it stipulated to the 
interrogation transcript. The State is bound by its decision 
below, and limited to the record it made. 
Strain involved a motion to suppress a confession on the 
grounds of an inadequate Miranda warning and coercive statements by 
the police indicating that absent a confession defendant would face 
10The fact that the State could have presented additional 
evidence below does not affect the completeness of the record: the 
record here accurately and completely reflects all that transpired 
in the trial court, and fully allows this court to review those 
proceedings. 
11 State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
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the death penalty. The trial court originally granted the motion 
to suppress due to lack of Miranda warnings. Later discovered 
evidence indicated that Strain was in fact properly Mirandized, and 
the trial court reversed its order of suppression. The trial court 
never specifically addressed Strain's objection concerning the 
coercive statements. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded: 
In the instant case, the trial court did not 
address the defendant's contention that even though an 
adequate Miranda warning had been given to him, his 
subsequent confession was the result of coercive threats 
and promises made by the interrogating officers. We 
therefore do not have before us an adequate record upon 
which we can determine the question of voluntariness. 
Strain, 779 P. 2d at 227. Justice Zimmerman's concurrence is 
instructive: 
As the majority notes, the detective's comments were 
plainly outside the bounds of permissible interrogation 
and were, on their face, coercive. Moreover, the 
transcripts demonstrate that defendant's confession was 
made immediately after these coercive statements. For 
the benefit of the trial court and the parties, I think 
we should indicate that while the State has contended 
that "it may be possible . . . to find . . . that Bell's 
improper statements did not actually induce defendant to 
confess" (emphasis added), if such a finding were based 
on nothing more than the evidence presented to us at this 
point, there would be some doubt as to such finding's 
sustainability. 
Id. at 227-8. In this case, the trial court ruled directly on the 
issues presented by defendant's motion to suppress. The State 
offered all the evidence it cared to, and the trial court ruled in 
the State's favor. This court should rule now on the sufficiency 
of the record the State created below, without a legally 
unwarranted and factually unnecessary remand that will elicit 
nothing helpful to this Court's determination. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State is engaging in pure speculation, and seeks a 
second bite at the apple. Appellate courts review what occurred 
below without reinventing the wheel. Any evidence the State felt 
was necessary and appropriate should have been presented below. 
The State has waived its right to have the trial court, or any 
other court, review the interrogation recording. 
This matter is ripe for decision. As the State freely 
admits, the record below cannot support the trial court's 
determination that Ms. Gutierrez waived her right to remain silent. 
This case should be reversed, with directions to suppress Ms. 
Gutierrez' statements and grant her a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^3jjjj day of June, 1993. 
i£ tfd-— 
ROBERT K. HETNEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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